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Some jihadist Web sites monitored by CNN are warning al Qaeda leaders that a recently captured field commander had more than 300 names and numbers plus important documents on him at the time of his arrest.

A U.S. counterterrorism official confirmed that Abdullah Saleh al-Eidan was captured in Oman in late January and is being held now in Saudi Arabia. The official, who is not authorized to speak on the record because of the sensitive nature of the information, would not comment on what intelligence has been gathered from al-Eidan.

But the official did say al-Eidan was caught as he was carrying information from al Qaeda "central" in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region to its affiliate in Yemen known as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Oman, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are all located on the Arabian peninsula.

Al-Eidan has a background in explosives and is said to go by the name Barud, which is Arabic for a kind of explosive powder. The U.S. counterterrorism official said al-Eidan is not a senior member of al Qaeda, but he is "far from being just a foot soldier."

One of the jihadist Web sites posted a note on January 28 from an unidentified sender to al Qaeda leaders in Yemen and Afghanistan. It said that al-Eidan had been arrested in Oman and that "he had on his person more than 300 numbers and pictures and important names."

The message encouraged the leaders "to change their locations and mobile numbers as soon as possible."

Some experts question whether al Qaeda would have one individual carry that much important information. But if it is true, this could represent a possible gold mine for intelligence agencies.

It also may indicate a much tighter tie between al Qaeda central and its affiliate in Yemen than had been previously understood.

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Why is the military publicizing its upcoming operations in Afghanistan?

When it comes to launching a major military operation, most would assume that preparations are done secretly so as not to tip off the enemy.

So how do the U.S., coalition military and Afghan government prepare for a major clearing operation to eliminate the Taliban from an insurgent stronghold? Talk about it publicly ahead of time.

For months now, one of the worst kept secrets in Afghanistan's central Helmand region has been the forthcoming operation to take back control of the poppy-covered and Taliban-held Marjah district in the restive central Helmand
province region.

The area is home to some of the most serious fighting between the coalition and Taliban in the country, and also is some of the most fertile land in the country.

Central Helmand is also home to the majority of the world supply of heroin, about 60 percent, according to U.S. government officials. The relationship of convenience between narco-traffickers and the Taliban brings in about $400 million to the Taliban from the poppy sales, "more than enough for them to conduct the kind of operations they do," according to a senior U.S. military official.

The U.S. military has been briefing reporters for months on basics, mainly that the Marjah region is the target of this operation. However, officials have been leaving out details of how and when the operation will go down.

The British military even put out a press release with the name of the effort, Operation Moshtarak, which means "together" in Afghanistan's Persian-language dialect of Dari, saying the military is in the "shape" phase of the operation.

There have also been discussions with local governmental leaders about the operation, and those leaders have in turn spread the word around the local population.

So why, if the enemy is concentrated in one area, would the top commander in Afghanistan authorize the publicity of a major operation to go in, clear the area of Taliban and try to convince poppy growers to switch to wheat? It is a curious plan, but a plan that both Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen agree with and signed off on.

The answer, it seems, is based on human nature. If you are told the military is going to conduct a major operation in your region and you are one of the bad guys, common sense says you pack up and leave.

But in this case, part of the message has been sent to the local population to let them know the Afghan government will support them if they change from growing poppy to growing wheat of other non-narco crops. That paves the way, the military hopes, for less combat and leaves Afghan and coalition forces with a local population, in theory, willing to work with them.

There are problems with this kind of plan, though. The Taliban have plenty of time to plant roadside bombs and leave other deadly surprises behind for the Afghan and coalition troops.

The military understands this and expects this, and is prepared for casualties - but the benefits outweigh the negatives, according to military officials.

If the local population understands ahead of time that the government and local security forces will deliver jobs and security, then the fight will not be that bad.

The Marjah model is something McChrystal is counting on working; if it does, it will be applied to numerous other problem areas around the country, according to U.S. military officials.

Proof that this could work is counter-intuitively based on the failure of U.K. troops in the same area last year. There was no support form the local government or Afghan forces and the local governances did not end up supporting
the local populations and remained influenced by the Taliban.

U.S. commanders are hopeful, and believe this formula of broadcasting the plans that will be more effective.

The question remains - if this does not work, where does that leave the U.S. and the Afghan government in the eyes of the local population who already are weary of their intentions?

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