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From 2008 to 2010, the U.S. government paid $4 million to RWA, a consortium of three Afghan contractors – only to see it pave less than two-thirds of a mile on a road that’s supposed to stretch 17.5 miles. The contractors said the area had become too violent to work in, but U.S. and Afghan provincial officials think that two of the principals absconded to New Zealand and the Netherlands, having pocketed much of the cash.

U.S. officials describe the Ghazni affair in positive terms: They saved the $6 million that remained on the contract for other projects, terminated RWA’s existing contracts and blackballed it from future work, and say they’re ready to cooperate with Afghan investigators should they decide to pursue legal action against the consortium.

But it’s also a reminder that corruption, violence and political disputes continue to plague U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Last year, a McClatchy Newspapers investigation found that U.S. government funding for at least 15 large-scale Afghan programs and projects ballooned from just over $1 billion to nearly $3 billion – despite questions about their effectiveness or cost – in the headlong rush to rebuild the country and shore up its struggling government. http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2011/11/16/afghan-4-million-road-to-nowher
e/ can't find the original article, but as McCaskill described it, they were given a million or so dollars out of the money intended for the project, and built 2/3 of a mile of roadway. Then they claimed they needed more money and were given another 3 million. Nothing has ever happened since. Best guess is the guys in charge didabscond with the money. This is SO representative of Afghan mentality, I had to smile.

But it's also a serious matter. This is a prime example of

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an almost endless list of reconstruction projects that failed, either due to corruption, stupidity or both. In Iraq we spent millions to pave roads from nowhere to nowhere (waste), or to pave roads that did not exist (corruption), or in one instance I wrote about, pave a road that ended up making it easier for insurgents to shift fighters around and thus had to be unpaved at our own expense (both). http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2011/11/16/afghan-4-million-road-to-nowher
e/ we're doing it again in Afghanistan. Even the things we build that WORK can't be maintained in poverty-stricken nations like Iraq and Afghanistan, and we shouldn't be spending them unless they're worthwhile. The same problem existed when we lived there, but America doesn't seem to have learned her lesson. My dad was sent over there specifically BECAUSE the planes Pan Am gave them, as I've said before, were flown without maintenance until they literally fell down in the desert, then the Afghanst just walked away from them. Afghans brought to America to be trained didn't want to go back, and of course fraud is rampant.

Nothing has changed in that respect at least, apparently. Sen. Claire McCaskill at least tried to do something:

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U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill today introduced a measure that aims to strip funds for large-scale construction projects in Afghanistan and redirect those resources for use in the construction of roads and bridges in America.

McCaskill, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, delivered a floor speech today in which she explained her plan to limit U.S. Defense Department spending on unsustainable infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. The limits would not affect any resources directly supporting U.S. troops. The savings that result from the limits would be redirected from infrastructure projects in Afghanistan to road and bridge projects in the United States where there is currently an $2 trillion backlog in road, bridge, and infrastructure needs.

The Defense Department currently uses two pots of money to pay for major infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the recently-created Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). (We have NEVER before created an independent infrastructure fund, separate from the military fund, by the way--they did this to avoid the limitations noted below.) Originally designed to provide commanders on the ground with funding for small-scale humanitarian and repair projects to build goodwill in local populations, CERP spending ballooned into multi-million dollar contracts for highways, power projects, and more. Although Congress last year placed modest restrictions on CERP spending ($20 million per project), the new AIF is being used for projects ranging between $40 million and $130 million each. Since 2004, more than $6.9 billion has been spent on CERP and AIF projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“I support the mission in Afghanistan—but after years of work on wartime contracting issues, and looking at the way we have spent money through contracting in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I have come to a stark and real conclusion about money that we have wasted and continue to waste in this effort: we are building infrastructure in Afghanistan that we cannot secure and that will not be sustained,” said McCaskill, who has used her position as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight to fight waste, fraud, and abuse of American tax dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan. “I can’t stand by as we spend billions on roads, electrical grids, bridges in Afghanistan, knowing the incredible need we have in this country for exactly that kind of investment. These projects are not being built in a secure environment. We’re paying off people to try to keep the contractors safe. And it has been documented that some of that money has gone right into the hands of our enemies. Now, that must be stopped.”

A 2011 report by the Counterinsurgency Advisory Team for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan found that there was “no persuasive evidence” that CERP had “fostered improved interdependent relationships between the host government and the population—arguably the key indicator of counterinsurgency success.” The report also cited the risk that CERP funding could be wasted, contribute to corruption, or be siphoned off for insurgents.

McCaskill’s amendment would prohibit resources from either CERP or AIF to be used for construction and infrastructure projects, except for those projects that do not exceed $50,000—allowing American commanders on the ground the ability to continue projects that fulfill the original intent of CERP. McCaskill’s amendment would not affect the ability of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—which typically undertakes development overseas—to continue funding infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.

McCaskill’s measure would require that all remaining CERP and AIF funding (authorized at a total of $800 million for fiscal year 2012) be directed to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation for road and bridge projects in the United States, providing a boost to American transportation and construction jobs.

“These projects in many instances cannot be sustained,” said McCaskill, who also visited U.S. troops in Afghanistan last year. “All you have to do is travel around Iraq and see the empty, crumbling health care centers built with American taxpayer dollars. The water park that is a twisted pile of rubble that is no longer operational. All of the investments made in oil production and electricity generation that were blown to bits… Let’s do this. Let’s stop these large projects that cannot be secured or be sustained. We should take this investment and put it in roads and bridges right here in our country.” http://mccaskill.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1410

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I wholeheartedly agree.

The amendment, predictably, failed.

So we'll go on with stuff like this:

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One example cited in the report was an effort in 2009 to distribute vouchers for wheat seed and fertilizer in drought-stricken areas of northern Afghanistan. Under pressure to increase spending, USAID, the government agency providing economic and humanitarian assistance, boosted spending to $1 million a day in each of a dozen districts, creating an environment “in which waste was rampant,” the report noted.

The document also cited the soaring cost of building the $82 million Afghan Defense University, that country’s equivalent of West Point. Defense officials now concede that Afghanistan may not be able to afford the $40 million a year needed to operate and maintain the university.

Other examples cited in the report included one Afghanistan road project involving the New Jersey-based Louis Berger Group and Black & Veatch, Kansas City’s largest engineering firm. According to the report, the project more than doubled from its $86 million estimate due to unexpectedly high security costs. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/01/122809/fraud-waste-in-iraq-and-a
fghan.html#ixzz1fPCAo9dR

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"I imagine the military might not want to give up this big pile of money if only because it's a big pile of money". I won't mention who said that (not McCaskill), but it's what happened.

To quote McCaskill herself (who has spent five years investigating contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan): "We can't keep doing this over and over again, and saying 'we'll get better'. It's not getting better, and we need the money here. It's time for it to come home." Amen. But apparently we will keep on doing it. The American Way!