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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:
Has anybody here seen this?

Apparently based on a true story. I don't recall hearing anything about it, but now I saw some clips from it.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt4018690/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1

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Originally posted by second:
Here is the story as written by another pilot:
www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash

"Airline pilots were once the heroes of the skies. Today, in the quest for safety, airplanes are meant to largely fly themselves.

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Which is why the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, which killed 228 people, remains so perplexing and significant. William Langewiesche explores how a series of small errors turned a state-of-the-art cockpit into a death trap."

And the final summation:

"It seems that we are locked into a spiral in which poor human performance begets automation, which worsens human performance, which begets increasing automation. The pattern is common to our time but is acute in aviation. Air France 447 was a case in point. In the aftermath of the accident, the pitot tubes were replaced on several Airbus models; Air France commissioned an independent safety review that highlighted the arrogance of some of the company’s pilots and suggested reforms; a number of experts called for angle-of-attack indicators in airliners, while others urged a new emphasis on high-altitude-stall training, upset recoveries, unusual attitudes, flying in Alternate Law, and basic aeronautical common sense. All of this was fine, but none of it will make much difference. At a time when accidents are extremely rare, each one becomes a one-off event, unlikely to be repeated in detail. Next time it will be some other airline, some other culture, and some other failure—but it will almost certainly involve automation and will perplex us when it occurs. Over time the automation will expand to handle in-flight failures and emergencies, and as the safety record improves, pilots will gradually be squeezed from the cockpit altogether. The dynamic has become inevitable. There will still be accidents, but at some point we will have only the machines to blame."

It makes me ask, "Why is Wash flying Serenity on manual? Why haven't autopilots gotten good enough in 500 years to handle everything from liftoff to landing?"

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at www.mediafire.com/folder/1uwh75oa407q8/Firefly

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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:

This is an erroneous premise which leads to disastrous conclusions. It is not a real quest for safety, it is a false quest for safety. The airlines prefer to blame the Pilots whenever the Pilots fail to survive a crash. While dead, it is very difficult for them to defend themselves, therefore they are usually found to be at fault. The airlines don't want to admit their failures and faults in their practices, procedures, and policies - so they like the Pilots to be blamed, albeit falsely.
This false sense of Pilot fault, or percentage frequency of pilot fault, is what this pretend "quest for safety" is based upon, more fallacy built upon a foundation of fallacy.

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Originally posted by second:

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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:

This is an erroneous premise which leads to disastrous conclusions. It is not a real quest for safety, it is a false quest for safety. The airlines prefer to blame the Pilots whenever the Pilots fail to survive a crash. While dead, it is very difficult for them to defend themselves, therefore they are usually found to be at fault. The airlines don't want to admit their failures and faults in their practices, procedures, and policies - so they like the Pilots to be blamed, albeit falsely.
This false sense of Pilot fault, or percentage frequency of pilot fault, is what this pretend "quest for safety" is based upon, more fallacy built upon a foundation of fallacy.

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JewelStaiteFan, you misunderstood what happened on that fatal flight.

On the night of May 31, 2009, the pilots of Flight 447 did not serve their passengers well.

Unbeknownst to the pilots, ice crystals began to accumulate inside the airplane’s three air-pressure probes, known as pitot tubes, which were mounted on the underside of the nose. The clogging of that particular probe design was a known issue on certain Airbus models, and Air France had decided to replace the probes with ones of an improved design and had sent out an advisory to warn pilots of the problem. The first of the replacement probes had just arrived in Paris and were waiting in a storeroom to be installed.

For Flight 447, it was too late: the probes were quickly clogged. Just after 11:10 P.M., as a result of the blockage, all three of the cockpit’s airspeed indications failed, dropping to impossibly low values. Also as a result of the blockage, the indications of altitude blipped down by an unimportant 360 feet.

So here is the picture at that moment: the airplane was in steady-state cruise, pointing straight ahead without pitching up or down, and with the power set perfectly to deliver a tranquil .80 Mach. The turbulence was so light that one could have walked the aisles—though perhaps a bit unsteadily. Aside from a minor blip in altitude indication, the only significant failure was the indication of airspeed—but the airspeed itself was unaffected. No crisis existed. The episode should have been a non-event, and one that would not last long. The airplane was in the control of the pilots, and if they had done nothing, they would have done all they needed to do.

But the pilot pulled the stick back. Initially this may have been a startle response to the false indication of a minor altitude loss. But Bonin didn’t just ease the stick back—he hauled it back, three-fourths of the way to the stop, and then he kept on pulling. Alain Bouillard, the French investigator, equated the reaction to curling instinctively into a fetal position. The airplane responded by pitching up into an unsustainable climb, causing its speed to slow and its angle of attack to increase.

Six seconds after Bonin assumed control, with the C-chord altitude alert chiming in the cockpit, a brief stall warning sounded. It was a loud synthetic male voice. It said STALL one time. Robert said, “What was that?” The airplane answered, STALL STALL, and again the C-chord sounded. Neither pilot grasped the message.

A renowned cockpit designer at Boeing—himself a transport pilot—once said, “We don’t believe there are any bad pilots. We believe there are average pilots who have bad days.”

Even to the end, the pilots never understood the warning messages or how to recover from the stall. Just before the crash, the alarms were sounding PULL UP, STALL, PULL UP.

The pilot's famous last words recorded a second before Flight 447 pancaked into the Atlantic Ocean were, “Fuck, we’re dead.”

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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:
Has anybody here seen this?

Apparently based on a true story. I don't recall hearing anything about it, but now I saw some clips from it.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt4018690/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1

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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:

You have failed to grasp the relevance. I have forgotten - did you say you were in the Air Wing?

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Originally posted by second:

Quote:

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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:
This is an erroneous premise which leads to disastrous conclusions. It is not a real quest for safety, it is a false quest for safety. The airlines prefer to blame the Pilots whenever the Pilots fail to survive a crash. While dead, it is very difficult for them to defend themselves, therefore they are usually found to be at fault. The airlines don't want to admit their failures and faults in their practices, procedures, and policies - so they like the Pilots to be blamed, albeit falsely.
This false sense of Pilot fault, or percentage frequency of pilot fault, is what this pretend "quest for safety" is based upon, more fallacy built upon a foundation of fallacy.

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JewelStaiteFan, you misunderstood what happened on that fatal flight.

On the night of May 31, 2009, the pilots of Flight 447 did not serve their passengers well.

Unbeknownst to the pilots, ice crystals began to accumulate inside the airplane’s three air-pressure probes, known as pitot tubes, which were mounted on the underside of the nose. The clogging of that particular probe design was a known issue on certain Airbus models, and Air France had decided to replace the probes with ones of an improved design and had sent out an advisory to warn pilots of the problem. The first of the replacement probes had just arrived in Paris and were waiting in a storeroom to be installed.

For Flight 447, it was too late: the probes were quickly clogged. Just after 11:10 P.M., as a result of the blockage, all three of the cockpit’s airspeed indications failed, dropping to impossibly low values. Also as a result of the blockage, the indications of altitude blipped down by an unimportant 360 feet.

So here is the picture at that moment: the airplane was in steady-state cruise, pointing straight ahead without pitching up or down, and with the power set perfectly to deliver a tranquil .80 Mach. The turbulence was so light that one could have walked the aisles—though perhaps a bit unsteadily. Aside from a minor blip in altitude indication, the only significant failure was the indication of airspeed—but the airspeed itself was unaffected. No crisis existed. The episode should have been a non-event, and one that would not last long. The airplane was in the control of the pilots, and if they had done nothing, they would have done all they needed to do.

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But the pilot pulled the stick back. Initially this may have been a startle response to the false indication of a minor altitude loss. But Bonin didn’t just ease the stick back—he hauled it back, three-fourths of the way to the stop, and then he kept on pulling. Alain Bouillard, the French investigator, equated the reaction to curling instinctively into a fetal position. The airplane responded by pitching up into an unsustainable climb, causing its speed to slow and its angle of attack to increase.

Six seconds after Bonin assumed control, with the C-chord altitude alert chiming in the cockpit, a brief stall warning sounded. It was a loud synthetic male voice. It said STALL one time. Robert said, “What was that?” The airplane answered, STALL STALL, and again the C-chord sounded. Neither pilot grasped the message.

A renowned cockpit designer at Boeing—himself a transport pilot—once said, “We don’t believe there are any bad pilots. We believe there are average pilots who have bad days.”

Even to the end, the pilots never understood the warning messages or how to recover from the stall. Just before the crash, the alarms were sounding PULL UP, STALL, PULL UP.

The pilot's famous last words recorded a second before Flight 447 pancaked into the Atlantic Ocean were, “Fuck, we’re dead.”

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Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:

I did neglect to finish commenting on this post.

This is an erroneous premise which leads to disastrous conclusions.

This paragraph indicates you gave no clue etc., etc.

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