Russia Invades Ukraine. Again by captaincrunch

REAL WORLD EVENT DISCUSSIONS

Russia Invades Ukraine. Again

POSTED BY: CAPTAINCRUNCH
UPDATED: Tuesday, February 17, 2026 10:59
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Monday, February 16, 2026 5:12 AM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

Munich, 2007: The Day The West Was Told 'No'

Sunday, Feb 15, 2026 - 08:20 PM

Authored by Gerry Nolan via The Islander

They like to pretend it came out of nowhere.

They like the bedtime story: Europe was peacefully humming along in its post-history spa — open borders, cheap energy, NATO as a charity, Russia as a gas station with a flag… and then, one day, the barbarian kicked the door in for no reason at all.

That story is not just dishonest. It’s operational. It’s the propaganda you tell yourself so you can keep the addiction going without ever admitting how self-destructive it is.

Because the truth is uglier and far more incriminating: In Munich, on February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin stood on the most flattering stage the Atlantic system owns — the Security Conference where Western officials applaud themselves for maintaining “order” and he laid out, to their faces, the skeleton of the coming disaster. He didn’t whisper it in a back channel. He used the microphone to deliver some much needed medicine, however hard it would be for the Empire to swallow.

He even signaled he wasn’t going to play the usual polite theatre — the kind where everyone agrees in public and stabs each other in classified annexes. He said the format allowed him to avoid “pleasant, yet empty diplomatic platitudes.”

And then he did the unforgivable thing, (gasp!) he described the empire as an empire. He named the unipolar intoxication — that post–Cold War hallucination that history had ended, that power had found its final owner, that NATO could expand forever without consequences, that international law was optional for the enforcer class and compulsory for everyone else.

Putin’s core argument was brutally simple: a unipolar model is not only unacceptable, it’s impossible. Not “unfair.” Not rude. Impossible.

(Because in a world with) “one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making” is a world where security becomes privatized — where the strong reserve the right to interpret rules (with exemptions for themselves), and the weak are told to accept it as morality. (And yes, he put it in exactly those terms — one center, one force, one decision — the architecture of domination.)

And when you build that kind of world, everyone else does the only rational thing left: they stop trusting the wall of law to protect them, and they start arming for survival. Putin said it outright: when force becomes the default language, it “stimulates an arms race.”

This is where the Western client media — professionally disenginuous as ever, clipped one or two spicy lines and missed the larger point: Munich 2007 wasn’t “Putin raging.” It was Russia publishing its redlines in front of the class.

And then came the part that should have frozen the room. Putin named it – NATO expansion. Putin didn’t argue it as nostalgia. He argued it as provocation — a deliberate reduction of trust. He asked the question no Western leader ever answers honestly:

“Against whom is this expansion intended?”

And then he drove the blade in: what happened to the assurances made after the Warsaw Pact dissolved? “No one even remembers them.”

That line matters because it goes well beyond grievance — it’s a window into how Russia saw the post–Cold War settlement: not as a partnership, but as a rolling deception. Expand NATO, move offensive infrastructure, then call it “defensive.” Build bases, run exercises, integrate weapons systems, and insist the other side is paranoid for noticing.

Putin’s formulation was clean: NATO expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”

Now pause and look at the psychology of the West in that room. They didn’t hear a warning. They heard audacity. They didn’t hear “security dilemma.” They heard “how dare you speak like an equal.” That’s the cultural glitch at the heart of the Atlantic project: it believes its own core lie and cannot process sovereignty in others without treating it as aggression.

So Munich 2007 became, in Western memory, not the moment Russia told the truth — but the moment Russia “showed its hand.” The implication: Russia’s “hand” was evil, and therefore any response to it was justified. Which is exactly how you sleepwalk into catastrophe.

The real prophecy: not mysticism, mechanics

What was prophetic about Putin’s speech isn’t that he had a crystal ball.

It’s that he understood the West’s incentive structure:

A security system that expands by definition (NATO) needs threats by definition.
A unipolar ideology needs disobedience to punish, otherwise the myth collapses.
A rules-based order that breaks its own rules must constantly produce narrative cover.
An economic model that offshore-outs its industry and imports “cheap stability” must secure energy routes, supply chains, and obedience — by finance, by sanctions, by force.

Putin was saying: you can’t build a global security architecture on humiliation and expect it to be stable. Russia had lived through the wreckage of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq and that this playbook would be used again and again, with Georgia, with Syria, Libya, Iran and Russia itself if Putin did nothing.

He was also saying and this is where the Russophobic mass hysteria accelerates — that Russia would not accept a subordinate role in its own neighborhood, on its own borders, under a wannabe hegemon’s military umbrella.

This is where the Western catechism kicks in: “neighborhood” is called “sphere of influence” when Russia says it, and “security guarantees” when Washington says it. And so the hysteria machine warmed up.

You saw it in the immediate reception: Western elites, including Merkel and McCain treating the speech as an insult rather than a negotiation offer. You saw it in the years that followed — the steady normalization of the idea that Russia’s security concerns were illegitimate, and therefore could be ignored with moralistic lectures, free of consequences..

Ignore, expand, accuse, repeat.

That loop is your road to 2022 and to today, in Munich 2026. Groundhog day without learning the vital lessons to end the loop of utter madness.

Munich, Feb 13 (2026): Merz admits the order is dead — and calls it “uncertainty”

Fast forward. Same city. Same conference. Same Western liturgy, just with more panic in the eyes and the nucleus of a terrifying realization.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz using his best performative courage, murmured that the world order we relied on is no longer there. Framing the post–Cold War “rules-based order” as effectively crumbled and almost begging for a reset in transatlantic relations. He goes further: he talks up a stronger European defense posture, and pointed to discussions with France about a European nuclear deterrent concept, a “European nuclear shield.”

And then comes the line that should be carved into the marble of the Munich conference hall as Exhibit A: Merz argues that in this era, even the United States “will not be powerful enough to go alone.”

Read that again. The BlackRock chancellor on NATO’s spiritual home turf is effectively saying: the empire is overstretched, the illusion of old certainties are gone, and Europe will be left hung out to dry. Talk about strategic vertigo!

And it is exactly what Putin was talking about in 2007: when one axis tries to act as the planet’s owner, the cost accumulates — wars, blowback, arms races, fractured trust, until the system starts to wobble under its own contradictions.

Merz also reported begged the U.S. and Europe to “repair and revive” transatlantic trust. Repair trust with what currency? Because trust isn’t repaired by speeches. Trust is repaired by reversing the toxic and suicidal behaviors that destroyed it.

And those behaviors were precisely what Putin named in 2007:

expanding military blocs toward another power’s borders,
treating international law as a menu,
using economic coercion as a weapon,
and then pretending the consequences are “unprovoked.”

Europe is now gasping at the invoice for that policy set: industrial stress, energy insecurity, strategic dependency, and a political class that can’t admit how it got here without indicting itself.

So instead of confession, you get moral performance. Instead of strategy, you get hysteria and cartoon slogans. Instead of peace architecture, you get escalation management — the art of walking toward the cliff while calling it deterrence.

Merz’s remarks underscore that Europe is being forced to contemplate a harsher security environment and greater responsibility, all of its own suicidal making — but it still frames the Russia question in the familiar moralizing register.

Which is the whole tragedy: they can feel the tectonic plates shifting beneath them, yet they keep reciting the same old prayers that summoned the earthquake.

Why we’re here: the Western addiction to expansion — and the manufactured Russophobia that lubricated it

Russophobia is more than just bloodthirsty prejudice. It’s the (failed) policy tool of choice of the last few empires against Russia. It’s what you pump into the Mockingbird media bloodstream to make escalation feel like virtue and compromise feel like treason.

You don’t have to love everything Russia does to see the mechanism: a permanent narrative of Russian menace makes every NATO move sound defensive, every EU economic self-harm sound righteous, and every diplomatic off-ramp sound like appeasement.

It creates a psychological environment where:

NATO expansion becomes “freedom,”
coups become “democratic awakenings,”
sanctions become “values,”
censorship becomes “information integrity,”
and war becomes “support.”

Putin's 2007 Munich speech is the most important he ever gave. After years of failed attempts to have Russia included in a shared pan-European security architecture based on indivisible security, Putin warned Russia could no longer accept the threats posed by US global primacy pic.twitter.com/qQg7d3X0g3
— Glenn Diesen (@Glenn_Diesen) August 21, 2025

And once you install that operating system, you can torch your own industry and still call it moral leadership.

That’s the dark comedy of Europe since 2014 — accelerating post 2022: self-sanctioning, deindustrializing pressure, energy price shocks, and strategic submission to Washington’s delusion of carving up Russia, sold as “defending democracy.” Meanwhile, Moscow reads the West’s behavior the same way it read it in 2007: as a hostile architecture closing in, dressed up as virtue.

Putin’s Munich speech — again, not mysticism — warned that when the strong monopolize decision-making and normalize force, the world becomes less safe, not more.

So what did the West do?

It made the “rules-based order” a brand — while breaking rules (international law) whenever convenient. Exceptionalism at almost biblical levels, God’s chosen people. It expanded NATO while insisting the expansion was harmless.

It treated Russian objections as evidence of Russian guilt — which is circular logic worthy of an inquisitor. And it nurtured a media culture that could not imagine Russia as a rational actor responding to a pattern of ugly regime change behavior — only as a cartoon villain driven by pathology. Not analysis but theological warfare.

The punchline Munich won’t say out loud

Here’s the line Munich still cannot speak, even in 2026, even with Merz admitting the old order is gone: The West didn’t misread Putin’s warning. It rejected it because accepting it would have meant limiting itself.

Munich 2007 was a chance — maybe the last clean one — to build a European security architecture that wasn’t just NATO with better PR. A chance to treat Russia as a Great Power with legitimate interests, not a defeated adversary to be regime changed and broken apart.

And now, in Munich 2026, they stand amid the wreckage and call it “uncertainty,” as if the storm blew in from nowhere. The BlackRock Chancellor calls for resets, for revived trust, for Europe to become stronger, for new deterrence ideas.

But the reset Munich needs is the one it refuses:

reset the premise that NATO will remain a viable alliance beyond the war in Ukraine,
reset the premise that Russia must absorb strategic humiliation and accept the inverse, the reality as it is – where it’s in fact Western Europe that is wearing the humiliation.
reset the premise that international law is a tool of the powerful,
reset the premise that Europe’s role is to be the forward operating base and

European sovereignty sacrificed to buy the Empire time .

Until that happens, Munich will keep happening — every year, more anxious, more militarized, more rhetorical, more detached from the material reality its own disastrous policies created. And Putin’s “prophecy” will keep looking prophetic — not because he conjured the future, but because he correctly described the machine.
https://islanderreports.substack.com/p/munich-2007-the-day-the-west-wa
s

-----------

"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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Monday, February 16, 2026 7:44 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Ukraine used to beg for matching missiles. The Shershen fires whatever is in the warehouse.

Shershen matches a lot of different radars, launchers and missiles. It’s just what Ukraine needs.

By David Axe | Feb 15, 2026

https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/02/15/shershen/

Ukraine has a substantial number of surface-to-air missiles of different types. Ukraine also has significant quantities of launchers and radars for the missiles. One of Ukraine's main air defense problems is that the missiles, launchers, and radars don't necessarily match. So many missiles, launchers, and radars go unused.

That's why the new Shershen air defense system is such a big deal. The system, under development by the National Association of Defense Industry of Ukraine, is compatible with—so far—five different missiles, according to Militarnyi. The missiles include Soviet, Ukrainian, and Western types.

If Shershen works as designed, Ukraine could turn its stockpiles of orphaned missiles and radars into functioning air defense batteries—without waiting for Western deliveries that often arrive months late.

The system "eliminates dependence on a single supplier," NAUDI director Serhiy Honcharov told Militarnyi.

NAUDI showed off a scale model of the Shershen at a recent trade show in Saudi Arabia. The model hints at the system's capabilities.

For starters, it appears to include launchers for both short-range and medium-range missiles, meaning it could defend against manned aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles. Basically, all but the most kinetic Russian munitions, such as heavy ballistic missiles. For those targets, Ukraine would still rely on American-made Patriot batteries and European SAMP/T batteries.

The model on display in Saudi Arabia is fitted with what appear to be either German IRIS-T or British ASRAAM short-range infrared-guided missiles. More interestingly, the medium-range missiles in the Shershen display in Saudi Arabia are R-27s.

Normally, an air-to-air missile with either radar or infrared guidance and a range of up to 100 km, the R-27 is one of the few medium-range air defense missiles that Ukrainian industry can produce on its own.

Not coincidentally, the radar in the Shershen display seems to be a version of the made-in-Ukraine Radionix Esmeralda—normally a fighter radar for types such as the Sukhoi Su-27 and Mikoyan MiG-29. The Su-27 and MiG-29, both of which the Ukrainian air force flies in large numbers, routinely carry R-27s while patrolling for Russian fighters, drones, and cruise missiles.

Different sensors

To be clear, Shershen is compatible with other radars, including foreign models. But with a radar and a medium-range missile that are both made in Ukraine, Shershen could help preserve Ukraine's air defense autonomy. Kyiv wouldn't need to beg allies for missiles, launchers, and radars in order to defend itself from Russian attack.

Shershen is the natural extension of the Ukrainian "FrankenSAM" concept, which pairs available missiles, launchers and radars via various hardware and software "bridges" that help the mismatched components work together.

There are many FrankenSAMs in Ukrainian service, but each required specific engineering in order to mate disparate radar and launchers with, usually, one or two missile types. Shershen is more of a universal system that can readily accommodate a much wider array of radars, launchers, and missiles.

Yes, NAUDI claimed Shershen is compatible with five different missiles. But five is the floor, not the ceiling. "Why five?" Honcharov asked. "Because five were simply fired. If other types are needed for implementation, the work will be carried out to adapt them, and they can also be used with this system."

That's one way for Ukraine to ensure it always has some way of shooting down most Russian drones and missiles.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, February 16, 2026 8:53 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

February 16, 2026 10:00 AM

Fueled by Russia-friendly politicians, the Nord Stream case may become a domestic policy issue in Germany.

The leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, Alice Weidel, said that if they win the elections, they will demand Kyiv pay for the damage to the Nord Stream pipelines and reimburse the funds allocated for Ukraine's aid.

https://kyivindependent.com/in-germany-a-ukrainian-nord-stream-suspect
-becomes-a-test-for-wartime-law/

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, February 16, 2026 12:08 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

NATO State Floats Developing Own Nuclear Defenses

By Ellie Cook | Feb 16, 2026

https://www.newsweek.com/poland-nuclear-weapons-us-umbrella-11527787

NATO member Poland should move toward developing nuclear defenses, the country's president has said.

"I am a big supporter of Poland's participation in a nuclear project," Karol Nawrocki said during an interview with the country's Polsat News outlet.

“We are a country right on the border of an armed conflict, and we know what the attitude of the aggressive, imperial Russian Federation toward Poland is," Nawrocki said.

Poland, pressed up on NATO's eastern flank, looks with more anxiety toward the looming threat of Russia than many of its fellow alliance members.

. . .

Russia confirmed in 2023 that it had moved tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, its key ally. Moscow used Belarusian territory to help launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago. Poland borders Belarus and Ukraine, as well as Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad. A slew of Russian drones crossed over into Poland in September 2025, prompting NATO members to beef up protection for Polish airspace. Russia said it had not intentionally targeted a NATO member.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, February 16, 2026 12:27 PM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Military historian says Tomahawks could expose Putin’s ‘weak point’

By Kathrine Frich | Feb 16, 2026

https://www.dagens.com/war/military-historian-says-tomahawks-could-exp
ose-putins-weak-point

Long-range precision weapons have become one of the defining factors of the war in Ukraine.

Among the most well-known of these systems is the American-made Tomahawk cruise missile, capable of travelling vast distances and hitting strategic targets with high accuracy.

For decades, it has been a central component of US military operations.

A decisive factor

Military historian Grigory Tamar believes such weapons could significantly shift the balance in Ukraine’s favour.

Speaking in an interview with Anastasia Fedora on YouTube, cited by Dialog, he argued that providing Kyiv with long-range missiles would bring the end of the war closer.

“I am not the president of the United States, but I know Putin’s weak point without a doubt. The couple of hundred Tomahawk missiles that have been transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces are such a weak point for Putin – it can’t get weaker than that,” Tamar said.

He suggested that the psychological and strategic impact of such missiles would outweigh their numbers.

Drawing a historical comparison, he added: “At one time, Tomahawk missiles were one of the factors that encouraged Gorbachev to get closer to the United States in the mid-1980s.”

Strategic restraint

Tamar also addressed why Ukraine has not directly targeted what he described as “decision-making centers” inside Russia.

“Ultimately, everything that is happening, even if we don’t like it (and it hurts both you and us, because our blood is being shed, not Trump’s), is subordinated to the concept of deterring China,” he said.

He argued that any potential strikes deep inside Russia would require coordination with Washington and reflect broader geopolitical considerations.

There has been no official confirmation that Ukraine has received Tomahawk missiles.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Monday, February 16, 2026 3:34 PM

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Tuesday, February 17, 2026 7:59 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

The United States should provide Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles and other military aid to increase pressure on Moscow, Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) on Feb. 16.

Speaking at a news conference during his visit to Kyiv, Blumenthal called for a broad package of support, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense batteries, more F-16s, expanded drone production, and a wide range of other military equipment. He also urged passage of a sanctions bill he said would deliver a powerful economic blow to Putin and help force him to the negotiating table.

On Feb. 13, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) similarly called for Kyiv to be armed with U.S. cruise missiles. “I want the United States to supply Tomahawks to reach out and hurt the infrastructure that [Russian dictator Vladimir] Putin counts on to build the drones and all the other stuff,” Graham said at the Munich Security Conference.

https://english.nv.ua/nation/give-ukraine-tomahawks-sen-blumenthal-urg
es-50584468.html

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Tuesday, February 17, 2026 7:59 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Ukraine reclaims 201 square kilometers in five days as Russia struggles without Starlink

February 16, 2026, 05:03 PM

https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/ukraine-reclaims-201-square-kilomete
rs-in-five-days-50584463.html

Ukraine’s defense forces regained 201 square kilometers of territory between Feb. 11 and Feb. 15, their fastest pace of advance since mid-2023.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Tuesday, February 17, 2026 9:19 AM

SECOND

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

Russia's mobilization arithmetic. How many can the Kremlin send to war?

By Liubov Tsybulska | February 17, 2026 2:36 PM

https://kyivindependent.com/russias-mobilization-arithmetic-how-many-c
an-the-kremlin-send-to-war/

When Russia announced a "partial" mobilization in the fall of 2022, its society experienced a genuine shock.

The queues at the Upper Lars border crossing into Georgia and the chaotic roundups of reservists are still fresh in public memory. The Russian authorities learned from that episode and shifted tactics toward a more concealed form of mobilization.

Several tools were deployed at once: mass recruitment from prisons, sending convicts to the front in exchange for pardons, and aggressive enlistment of "volunteers" through generous financial incentives — large signing bonuses, debt write-offs, promises of high salaries and a "better life," albeit often a short one.

This approach worked pretty well. Despite brutal "meat-grinder assault" tactics and heavy casualties, Russia's war machine managed to recruit at least as many people as it lost on the battlefield.

Between 2023 and 2025, Russia recruited more than 400,000 people annually for the war against Ukraine. That number has been sufficient to sustain offensive operations, even if not enough to give the Kremlin the decisive advantage needed for rapid advances and large-scale occupation.

If Moscow wants to maintain its current pace of offensive operations, it will need roughly the same number of recruits in 2026. Fewer volunteers would force a reduction in assault intensity. More would allow the army to continue fighting with little regard for casualties.

Can Russia recruit enough people?

The short answer is yes. Russia can announce another "partial" mobilization — selective, random, semi-coercive, whatever term it chooses — and pull hundreds of thousands into the army in a relatively short period.

Over the past four years, the state has prepared for this. New laws have made draft evasion far more difficult, penalties have increased, and digital registries of conscripts have been tightened. Police will not need to chase reservists: draft notices can now be issued electronically, and attempts to avoid them may lead to prison sentences — from which many will ultimately still be sent to war.

So yes, Russia has the capacity to mobilize people for continued aggression.

But the broader answer is more complex. The Kremlin will try to avoid an open mobilization. The lessons of fall 2022 were learned. Even an otherwise passive society experienced shock, and the political risks for the regime were real. A new mobilization might be technically smoother thanks to updated laws and better preparation, but Moscow still prefers not to risk it.

After all, why announce mobilization when, for four years, state propaganda has insisted that Russia is winning and that Ukrainian forces and "foreign mercenaries" are on the verge of collapse? As long as the war remains something seen on television, Russians will continue to support it and avoid openly challenging the regime.

Moreover, participation in the war has become part of a revised social contract: it is acceptable — even encouraged — if it is well paid. Few mourn these "volunteers." There is a tacit understanding that they went to war for money and must bear responsibility for their choice.

The Russian "volunteer": chasing fast money

Anyone who has spent time on Russian social media over the past three years (hopefully for research purposes) has seen the flood of contract recruitment ads. They are everywhere: banners, targeted posts, regional groups, federal channels. The message is simple: sign a contract with the Russian army.

The offer is generous. Millions of rubles as a signing bonus, additional payments, high monthly salaries, debt forgiveness, and preferential mortgages. For a security guard or shop assistant in a provincial town earning 40–60 thousand rubles a month ($500-800), war looks like a social elevator moving far faster than any civilian career.

Fast money attracts vulnerable groups. The average Russian citizen owes banks about 456,000 rubles ($6,000) — roughly seven times their monthly income. An offer of 210,000 rubles a month ($2,700) in the trenches can look less like a death sentence and more like a chance to pay off a mortgage or escape chronic poverty.

This financial "opportunity" comes with obvious costs. Beyond the risk of death, corruption in the armed forces is widespread, soldiers often have to cover basic unit needs from their own pay, and reports of inhumane treatment by commanders are common. But that is a separate story.

The Kremlin shifted much of the financial burden of recruitment onto regional authorities. Regions were given quotas, and most incentive payments were funded by local budgets. Signing bonuses rose sharply — like the price of bitcoin during a boom. In 2024 and early 2025, regions competed in generosity: Tatarstan, Samara, and the Yamalo-Nenets region offered more than 3 million rubles for signing a contract. Many others followed with payouts of 2–3 million ($26,000-39,000).

By late 2025, the bubble burst. Budget deficits — recorded in 67 regions — forced authorities to drastically cut payments. In Samara, the bonus dropped from 3.6 million rubles to 400,000 (from $47,000 USD to $5,200). Tatarstan followed suit, reducing payouts to the Kremlin's recommended minimum. Similar cuts occurred across much of the country.

How many will Russia mobilize in 2026?

This question is central not only for Ukraine's defense forces but also for international partners. Our team analyzed Russia's mobilization potential across demographic, political, and economic dimensions and identified five possible scenarios for 2026.

The most limited scenario would be a continuation of so-called hidden mobilization, amounting to about 200,000 recruits. With reduced regional payments, recruitment will likely fall below previous levels. The Kremlin will try to compensate: pressuring conscripts to sign contracts, offering deals to criminal suspects, expanding reservist training cycles, and finding other ways to quietly fill the ranks.

A second possibility would involve a renewed partial mobilization, bringing total additional forces to around 400,000. If battlefield losses rise or Moscow sees an opportunity to shift momentum, a new mobilization wave is possible. Digital registries could make it smoother than in 2022, drawing mainly from the provinces without disturbing Moscow and St. Petersburg. Politically risky, but plausible.

A more expansive scenario — around 700,000 personnel — would likely affect major cities and middle-class families, raising social tensions and straining the economy. Possible, but unlikely unless the situation becomes critical.

A large-scale mobilization of one million troops would be demographically feasible but economically and politically destabilizing. It would require a near-total war economy, border closures, rationing, and possibly asset seizures.

Finally, a total mobilization of up to five million people is essentially unrealistic. Maintaining such a force would exceed Russia's entire security budget.

It is often said that time favours Russia because Ukraine's resources are limited. In reality, economic losses are accelerating the pressure on Moscow as well. The Russian state may be emotionally indifferent to casualties, but it is not immune to economic constraints.

Russia enters 2026 with a military budget exceeding 7% of GDP. That is enormous, yet still insufficient to secure victory. Demographically, Russia still has manpower for large mobilization waves. But economic and political vulnerabilities are significant. A new mobilization would test the regime: is it ready to break its implicit social contract and turn a semi-voluntary war into a forced one? And are Russians ready to fight under compulsion rather than for money? These questions may be answered in the coming months.

The worst mistake would be to treat this analysis as grounds for complacency. Today, the only force capable of stopping Russian advances — and the Kremlin's broader ambitions, including toward EU countries — is Ukraine's defense forces, properly armed and supported.

The year 2026 offers a real chance for Ukraine and its Western partners to significantly weaken Russia. But this chance is not guaranteed. Inaction or delay will push the Kremlin to seek new funding sources, geopolitical alliances, and economic arrangements to sustain the war.

The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two

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Tuesday, February 17, 2026 9:57 AM

SIGNYM

I believe in solving problems, not sharing them.

I appreciate your reliable posts of Ukrainian psyops, SECOND. Keep up the good work.

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"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal."- Henry Kissinger

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